I. Introduction
On 18 October 2011 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) released its decision in Brüstle v Greenpeace.
1 This is a widely reported case on the exclusion from patentability of inventions related to human embryonic stem cells (HESCs) on morality grounds.
This report aims to verify whether the Brüstle ruling may expose the EU and some of its Member States to a WTO challenge for failing to comply with Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement as well as whether the decision may have an impact in fields other than HESCs and thus be invoked to oppose the issuance, or challenge the validity, of any patent obtained through immoral or unlawful activities.
II. The decision
The facts of the case are well-known. Dr. Olivier Brüs-tle from the University of Bonn obtained a German patent covering isolated and purified neural precursor cells produced from HECSs.
2 By growing specific tissue from these cells, this invention is intended to treat damaged organs in patients suffering from various diseases including Parkinson's. Greenpeace successfully challenged the patent before the Federal Patent Court on morality grounds: it was basically argued that patenting an invention based on a human embryo which is later destroyed is unethical. Dr. Brüstle appealed the decision before the German Supreme Court which eventually referred the case to the CJEU. The CJEU was asked to interpret Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44 on the patentability of biotechnological inventions (Biotech Directive 3 ), according to which, "uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes" are not patentable. 3 The directive was adopted on 6 July 1998. The Netherlands brought Case C-377/98 before the CJEU against the adoption of the directive with six different pleas and requested the annulment of the directive. In its ruling of 9 October 2001 the Court dismissed the application brought by the Netherlands and confirmed the validity of the directive.
4 The list also includes the following non-patentable inventions: (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.
intends to guide the implementation and interpretation of the broader morality clause of Article 6(1), according to which inventions cannot be patented if their commercial exploitation is contrary to ordre public or morality.
5
In its decision of 18 October 2011 the CJEU first gave a broad interpretation of "human embryos" under Article 6(2)(c) by clarifying that any human ovum, as soon as fertilized, should be considered a "human embryo" if the fertilization is such as to commence the process of development of a human being. The above term, added the Court, also covers cells that are artificially stimulated or manipulated but not fertilized and which are able to trigger the development of a human being (so called parthenogenesis).
6
The Court also interpreted the expression, "uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes", under Article 6(2)(c). The issue was basically whether the use of embryos for research purposes amounts to a use for a mere commercial aim. The CJEU admitted that, in general, the concept of scientific research must be distinguished from industrial or commercial purposes. Yet, held the Court, as patent rights are in principle connected with activities of an industrial and commercial nature, the use of human embryos for the purposes of research which constitutes the subject matter of a patent application (as it was in Brüstle) cannot be separated from the patent itself and cannot therefore enjoy protection.
7
The final issue decided by the CJEU was whether an invention involving the destruction of human embryos can be considered patentable even though the patent specification (as in Brüstle) does not mention said destructive use. The Court held that such invention is not patentable.
8 Indeed, not excluding them from patentability would allow patent attorneys to skilfully draft claims to gain patentability on an otherwise non-patentable invention under Article 6(2) of the Biotech Directive. The CJEU thus held that an invention is not patentable if its implementation requires either the prior destruction of human embryos or their prior use as base material, even though the patent application does not mention such prior destruction or use.
9 As noted by the Advocate General, if that were not the case, the prohibition under Article 6(2) of the Biotech Directive would be easy to get around, as the applicant would simply have to avoid mentioning in the application that human embryos were destroyed or used: in such a manner the provision would be deprived of its effectiveness.
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The biotech industry has obviously criticised the ruling. One possible negative consequence -noted the industry -could be a "brain drain" towards more biotech-friendly countries such as the United States where there are no statutory limits on patent eligibility of inventions on moral and ordre public grounds.
11 In a letter published in the well-known scientific journal, Nature, on 28 April 2011 (a few weeks after the opinion released by Advocate General Bot, which was almost entirely followed in the CJEU's ruling), several scientists expressed their "profound concerns" about the possibility of a lack of patent protection in a highly R&D intensive industry such as the HESCs field. 12 5 Analogous provisions are contained in Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement ("Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality") and Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) ("European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to "ordre public" or morality […]". Rule 28 EPC reflects the contents of Article 6(2) of the Biotech Directive. The EPC Guidelines, Part C, C-IV and paragraph 4.1 confirm that the purpose of the patentability exclusion under Article 53(a) EPC is "to deny protection to inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or other generally offensive behavior". The Guidelines mention antipersonnel mines as an obvious example and note that this exception is likely to be relied on in extreme cases only, e.g. when the invention applied for is so abhorrent that the grant of the patent would be inconceivable.
6 See paragraphs 35-36 of the decision.
7 See paragraphs 42-43 of the decision. 9 It is clear from the way the third question was formulated that the said prior use of human embryos is a destructive one.
10 See paragraph 108 AG's opinion.
11 It should, however, be noted that the Brüstle ruling does not affect future HESCs inventions which do not involve the destruction of human embryos. This is an interesting point as new approaches have recently been proposed for deriving HESCs lines without injuring embryos.
12 Yet, the patenting of HESCs inventions has also been blamed for paving the way towards anticompetitive behaviors. In particular, it has been argued that many HESCs patents rely on very broad claims, which might stifle follow-on innovation in the nascent stem cells industry. 
III. A possible WTO implication of the ruling
The CJEU's decision may expose the EU and some of its Member States to litigation before the WTO adjudicatory bodies for allegedly violating Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.
13 As already mentioned, this provision states that, "Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment". Thus far WTO courts have given no interpretation of this provision. Yet it is believed that it should be interpreted as allowing the exclusion from patentability of a given invention only if at the same time the distribution and sale of the relevant product is prohibited.
14 This provision was lobbied for by industrialised countries during the Uruguay Round negotiations and mainly directed at developing and least developed nations. Indeed, absent this provision, the latter states could have pursued free-riding strategies by allowing the commercial exploitation of foreign inventions locally while maliciously prohibiting their patentability.
Another interpretation of Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement has been proposed according to which an actual ban on the sale of the relevant products would not be required as a condition for introducing an exclusion from patentability on the above grounds: a state would just need to prove that there is a mere necessity to prevent the commercial exploitation of the invention 15 . Such interpretation seems to be flawed. As has been noted, how could a state realistically claim that the prevention of the commercial exploitation of an invention in its territory is necessary if it simultaneously allows said commercial exploitation?
16 It seems thus reasonable to affirm that, in order to comply with this TRIPS provision, a country should guarantee that there is a symmetrical correspondence between ethical norms built inside patent law and moral provisions applied outside patent law. 17 This was also the position of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights of 25 June 1997 in the context of the discussions which eventually led to the enactment of the Biotech Directive.
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Having said that, the Brüstle decision -which has affirmed the non-patentability of HESCs inventions that involve the destruction of human embryosmay expose the EU to a challenge under Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, research and commercial activities which involve the use of human embryos, including destructive uses, are not specifically prohibited by EU legislation.
19 Some Member countries that have adopted quite liberal legislation in this specific regard (such as the United Kingdom) might also be involved in WTO litigation on the same grounds. And both the EU and those Member States which are "permissive" in the field of HESCs research would probably be unable to prove that in such a field there is a symmetrical correspondence between ethical norms built inside patent law (as is known, EU Member States must respect and follow CJEU rulings, including therefore the Brüstle decision) and moral provisions applied outside patent law.
In addition to a possible violation of the TRIPS Agreement, such a "systemic incoherence"
20 between legislation applied outside patent law and patent-related case law seems to violate the principle of legal certainty. The ruling in Brüstle, in particular, carries the risk of legitimising a paradoxical situation, which has obviously been highlighted and criticised by the biotech industry: i.e. the fact that the CJEU has rendered unpatentable what is not deemed as morally unacceptable by EU legislation and in several EU countries.
IV. Extending the effect of the ruling
One might also wonder whether the Brüstle decision might be invoked in other fields, for instance, in order to oppose the issuance, or challenge the validity, of patents covering inventions reached through unlawful activities. Indeed, as we have seen in the case at issue, it was held that an invention cannot be patented on morality grounds if its implementation requires either the prior destruction of human embryos or their prior use as base material, even though no reference to said prior destruction or use is made in the application. What can be learned from the ruling is that the full history of the invention is to be taken into account when applying morality and ordre public clauses. In other words, patent officers and judges should inquire whether the invention is built on immoral foundations, and not only whether the invention can be described in a moral manner when filing the patent application.
Two considerations stem from the above-finding of the Court.
First, the decision seems to contradict what the very CJEU held ten years earlier in the proceedings instituted against the Biotech Directive. On that occasion the Court noted that the directive in question regards only the issuance of patents and its "scope does not extend to activities before and after the grant, whether they involve research or the use of the patented products".
21
Second, the ruling leaves open a thorny question. How far must patent officers and judges dig to find an immoral act upon which an invention is based? In other words, what distance must there be between an immoral act and the patenting of the downstream product or process? The Advocate General in Brüstle dealt with this issue. He interestingly noted that one of the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found that several prisoners had been murdered with the intention to extract their organs for trafficking. He then asked himself the following question: if instead of trafficking there were experiments leading to new and inventive products or processes, would such inventions have had to have been considered as patentable on the grounds that how they had been reached was not included in the application? The Advocate General seemed to believe that these hypothetical inventions would be considered non-patentable based on morality grounds.
22
Many other examples could be given. For instance, does the use of slave or child labour in the manufacturing process of certain goods (e.g., rubber for tires made by Liberian slaves, footballs and sporting shoes made by Pakistani children, etc.) entail that said products could not be patented because they are morally unacceptable? Again there is no easy answer, even though the above observation by the Advocate General in Brüstle favors an affirmative response.
If an affirmative answer is eventually given to the above question, it is proposed to exclude from patentability on morality grounds the (many) biotech patents obtained as a result of the misappropriation of genetic resources. Indeed, as is well-known, many biotech-related patents in the last decades have been granted, and are nowadays still being granted, to companies or universities established in industrialised countries, but the relevant inventions use germplasm gathered in biodiversity-rich developing states, e.g. DNA sequences or genes extracted by plants which have particular and commercially valuable properties. This often occurs without requiring and obtaining prior informed consent from the country or local community which provides the germplasm in question, i.e. the raw material of the inventions. And it also often happens that the natural or legal persons that obtain these patents do not share the benefits stemming from the commercial exploitation of the invention with the local communities that have provided the raw materials and maintained their valuable properties throughout many years and sometimes even centuries.
23 These activities may also turn out to be contrary to key principles established by the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biodiversity. 24 The Biodiversity Convention was signed in 1992 and entered into force in December 1993. It establishes, (i) that states enjoy sovereignty rights on the genetic resources found on their territories, (ii) a system which allows respect for "prior informed consent" of the country providing the resource. and (iii) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of the resources with the above entity.
of murdered prisoners could not be patented based on morality grounds, why could not we deem nonpatentable, on the same grounds, patents obtained through the misappropriation of genetic resources? It seems indeed that the distance between such acts of misappropriation and the subsequent inventions is no greater than the distance between the experiments on the organs of murdered prisoners and the downstream inventions.
V. Conclusion
The Brüstle ruling has already been the object of hot debates and will continue to spur discussion in the months to come. It is difficult to foresee whether a WTO action under Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement will be eventually taken against the EU and/or some of its Member States. Indeed, the stem cell industry is still in its infancy and countries such as the United States may not be interested in running the risk associated with WTO litigation, especially considering that the provision in question -as we have seen -might be interpreted in different ways.
The ruling might also be open to extensive interpretation, and in particular it could be relied on in fields other than HESCs, for example in order to oppose the issuance, or challenge the validity, of patents covering any inventions obtained through illegal activities, including biotech inventions reached through the misappropriation of genetic resources. Indeed, one might argue that patent applicants should not be able to avoid a refusal or an invalidation decision just because upstream unlawful activities, which have been necessary to reach the invention, are not mentioned in the application.
